A popular and pervasive historical narrative links the Renaissance development of linear perspective with Europe’s transition from a pre-modern to an early modern society. Erwin Panofsky gave this narrative its definitive form early in the twentieth century and William Ivins boiled it down to a simple idea that served as the title of his most famous book. According to Ivins, single-point perspective, the artistic technique championed by Alberti and perfected in the paintings of Masaccio and Piero della Francesca, allowed for (...) “the rationalization of sight.” In other words, it provided a mathematically and geometrically grounded method for accurately representing the external world. It is a powerful and seductive claim, one that has shaped generations of scholarly work. It is also, Stuart Clark contends in this important new book, patently wrong. Far from exhibiting a renewed or reinvigorated confidence in the accuracy and reliability of vision, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers, artists, theologians, and doctors worried that sight was susceptible, perhaps permanently so, to all sorts of debilitating derangements, displacements, and delusions.Rather than relate a history of progress, Clark offers a history of exhaustion, failure, and, ultimately, of rejection. Early modern intellectuals inherited a comprehensive theory of vision and cognition from their medieval predecessors known as perspectivist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European CultureDallas G. Denery IIStuart Clark. Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 415. Cloth, $75.00.A popular and pervasive historical narrative links the Renaissance development of linear perspective with Europe’s transition from a pre-modern to an early modern society. Erwin Panofsky gave this narrative its definitive form (...) early in the twentieth century and William Ivins boiled it down to a simple idea that served as the title of his most famous book. According to Ivins, single-point perspective, the artistic technique championed by Alberti and perfected in the paintings of Masaccio and Piero della Francesca, allowed for “the rationalization of sight.” In other words, it provided a mathematically and geometrically grounded method for accurately representing the external world. It is a powerful and seductive claim, one that has shaped generations of scholarly work. It is also, Stuart Clark contends in this important new book, patently wrong. Far from exhibiting a renewed or reinvigorated confidence in the accuracy and reliability of vision, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers, artists, theologians, and doctors worried that sight was susceptible, perhaps permanently so, to all sorts of debilitating derangements, displacements, and delusions.Rather than relate a history of progress, Clark offers a history of exhaustion, failure, and, ultimately, of rejection. Early modern intellectuals inherited a comprehensive theory of vision and cognition from their medieval predecessors known as perspectivist optics. This theory sought to secure the accuracy of human sense perception through regularized causal processes that linked things in the world with our various cognitive faculties. While some fourteenth-century intellectuals, most notably Nicolas of Autrecourt and Nicole Oresme, recognized structural deficiencies in this theory, their critiques were mostly ignored or treated as anomalies. Over the course of the next two and a half centuries, Clark argues, the challenges to this theory multiplied until it collapsed under their weight (20).Clark’s argument is straightforward and, as his evidence mounts, thoroughly convincing. Throughout each of the eight engrossing chapters that form the core of the book, Clark outlines a different threat, a different set of challenges that pointed out problems with the assumption that vision is trustworthy. The range and depth of those challenges are truly amazing. Doctors worried that imbalances in our humoral system, and especially in the black bile that causes melancholy, could render our visual perceptions dubious at best (ch. 2). Theologians, wary of the dangers of witchcraft and eager to prosecute its practitioners, obsessed over the cognitive threats that devils and demons posed to good Christians (ch. 4), while Protestant reformers relegated the entire tradition of Catholic miracles to the counterfeit illusions of the antichrist (ch. 5). For their part, artists believed that perspective undermined vision, depending as it does on the assumption that what we see is always relative, dependent upon our point of view (ch. 3).Clark structures much of his argument around George Hakewill’s 1608 book, The vanitie of the eye, an exposition on the natural, artificial, and demonic sources that forever render visual knowledge suspect. He could just as well have organized it around the opening pages of Descartes’s Meditations, and in many ways Clark’s book serves as a superb rumination on the sources of Descartes’s skeptical arguments. Unlike Etienne Gilson and, more recently, Richard Popkin, both of whom have done so much to open up the scholastic and early modern sources of Descartes’s skeptical thought experiments, Clark does not limit himself to philosophical lineages. Rather, he considers sources of visual skepticism that developed across an entire culture—in natural philosophy, medicine, art, religion, and literature (especially in Shakespeare’s Macbeth). Not only does the sheer volume and variety of such [End Page 103] sources help to explain Descartes’s urgent desire to overturn everything he had learned and begin again from the foundations, but it also contextualizes the specific arguments he employs. None of Descartes’s skeptical arguments were new and most were well known in the Middle Ages. What had changed over the intervening centuries, Clark contends, was how these arguments drew from... (shrink)

"In this exquisitely written book, Denery draws on centuries of rumination on the moral issues surrounding lying to address the question of how we should live in a fallen world. The serpent in the Garden of Eden led humankind astray with lies. The Devil is the father of lies. Premodern sources agonized constantly over the act of lying. Denery not only superbly narrates the long history of this obsession, but also locates the conditions that reveal an Enlightenment shift (...) toward a not entirely comfortable modernity."--William Chester Jordan, Princeton University "Can God lie? Are women 'born liars'? These are just two of the questions Denery asks--and answers--in his wide-ranging, erudite study. Written in an engaging and accessible style, The Devil Wins sheds a new and fascinating light on a mendacious world stretching from the Book of Genesis to the dawn of the Enlightenment."--Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, author of Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378-1417 "This is a wonderful and beautifully written book. The fruit of extensive research, The Devil Wins traces the history of lying and deception through the medieval and early modern periods. Denery offers compelling and immensely significant arguments."--Ian P. Wei, author of Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris "This is a marvelous book. Denery uses a fundamental question--when, if ever, is it acceptable to lie?--to explore a vast intellectual and historical terrain. In doing so, he gives us one of the most subtle and penetrating briefs I have read for the importance of medieval thought for modern efforts to understand ethics, politics, and conscience. I read this book with enormous delight."--Jonathan Sheehan, author of The Enlightenment Bible. (shrink)

Dallas G. Denery - Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d'Autrecourt - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 119-120 Christophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d'Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00. Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the (...) Medieval Hume" by one of his first modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European CultureDallas G. Denery IIStuart Clark. Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 415. Cloth, $75.00.A popular and pervasive historical narrative links the Renaissance development of linear perspective with Europe’s transition from a pre-modern to an early modern society. Erwin Panofsky gave this narrative its definitive form (...) early in the twentieth century and William Ivins boiled it down to a simple idea that served as the title of his most famous book. According to Ivins, single-point perspective, the artistic technique championed by Alberti and perfected in the paintings of Masaccio and Piero della Francesca, allowed for “the rationalization of sight.” In other words, it provided a mathematically and geometrically grounded method for accurately representing the external world. It is a powerful and seductive claim, one that has shaped generations of scholarly work. It is also, Stuart Clark contends in this important new book, patently wrong. Far from exhibiting a renewed or reinvigorated confidence in the accuracy and reliability of vision, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers, artists, theologians, and doctors worried that sight was susceptible, perhaps permanently so, to all sorts of debilitating derangements, displacements, and delusions.Rather than relate a history of progress, Clark offers a history of exhaustion, failure, and, ultimately, of rejection. Early modern intellectuals inherited a comprehensive theory of vision and cognition from their medieval predecessors known as perspectivist optics. This theory sought to secure the accuracy of human sense perception through regularized causal processes that linked things in the world with our various cognitive faculties. While some fourteenth-century intellectuals, most notably Nicolas of Autrecourt and Nicole Oresme, recognized structural deficiencies in this theory, their critiques were mostly ignored or treated as anomalies. Over the course of the next two and a half centuries, Clark argues, the challenges to this theory multiplied until it collapsed under their weight (20).Clark’s argument is straightforward and, as his evidence mounts, thoroughly convincing. Throughout each of the eight engrossing chapters that form the core of the book, Clark outlines a different threat, a different set of challenges that pointed out problems with the assumption that vision is trustworthy. The range and depth of those challenges are truly amazing. Doctors worried that imbalances in our humoral system, and especially in the black bile that causes melancholy, could render our visual perceptions dubious at best (ch. 2). Theologians, wary of the dangers of witchcraft and eager to prosecute its practitioners, obsessed over the cognitive threats that devils and demons posed to good Christians (ch. 4), while Protestant reformers relegated the entire tradition of Catholic miracles to the counterfeit illusions of the antichrist (ch. 5). For their part, artists believed that perspective undermined vision, depending as it does on the assumption that what we see is always relative, dependent upon our point of view (ch. 3).Clark structures much of his argument around George Hakewill’s 1608 book, The vanitie of the eye, an exposition on the natural, artificial, and demonic sources that forever render visual knowledge suspect. He could just as well have organized it around the opening pages of Descartes’s Meditations, and in many ways Clark’s book serves as a superb rumination on the sources of Descartes’s skeptical arguments. Unlike Etienne Gilson and, more recently, Richard Popkin, both of whom have done so much to open up the scholastic and early modern sources of Descartes’s skeptical thought experiments, Clark does not limit himself to philosophical lineages. Rather, he considers sources of visual skepticism that developed across an entire culture—in natural philosophy, medicine, art, religion, and literature (especially in Shakespeare’s Macbeth). Not only does the sheer volume and variety of such [End Page 103] sources help to explain Descartes’s urgent desire to overturn everything he had learned and begin again from the foundations, but it also contextualizes the specific arguments he employs. None of Descartes’s skeptical arguments were new and most were well known in the Middle Ages. What had changed over the intervening centuries, Clark contends, was how these arguments drew from... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’AutrécourtDallas G. Denery IIChristophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00.Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the Medieval Hume" by one of his (...) first modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a long way towards recovering Nicholas's very real contributions to fourteenth-century intellectual life.Any attempt to interpret Nicholas's thought runs up against one significant problem—few of his works survive. All that remains are a fascinating and lengthy (not to mention, confusing and unfinished) work of natural philosophy, Exigit ordo, and several letters touching on issues in epistemology, cognition, and logic. As a result, even situating Nicholas's thought within the proper intellectual currents of the first decades of the fourteenth century has proven difficult. Whose work influenced him? Who were the objects of his criticism? What were his motives? Until recently, most scholars have attempted to trace the influence of William Ockham on Nicholas's thought. Drawing from recent work on the University of Paris during the fourteenth century, Grellard not only downplays Ockham's influence on Nicholas, but also Nicholas's membership in the faculty of theology. Rather, he stresses Nicholas's ongoing involvement in the arts faculty, where he continued to teach even as he studied for his degree in theology. This has two significant consequences. First, it allows Grellard to treat all of Nicholas's writings as contributions to the practice of natural philosophy. Indeed, in his compelling first chapter, Grellard contends that the initial sections of the Exigit, in which Nicholas famously condemns scholastic Aristotelianism as nothing more than an institutionalized pedagogy of error and untruth, must be read as a plea for a distinction between philosophy and theology, between speculation and faith. Even if Nicholas was not alone at the time in pushing for these distinctions (Ockham and John Buridan had argued along similar lines), Grellard demonstrates that Nicholas's approach was certainly the more radical and extreme. Second, the shift in focus from theology to arts brings with it a shift in Nicholas's most important interlocutors. To begin, Aristotle and Averroes become constant background forces in Nicholas's thought. Moreover, as the final section of Grellard's work makes clear, many of Nicholas's ideas are most usefully understood in light of writings of two other arts masters, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme, rather than in the context of debates among his contemporaries in the theology faculty. [End Page 119]These initial interpretive decisions shape the overall structure of Grellard's book, which moves, in three parts, from a deft analysis of Nicholas's theory of evidence and probability to his account of the objects of cognition and, finally, to a comparison of Nicholas's and Buridan's epistemological theories. Unlike so many prior studies that begin with Nicholas's famous critique of a fellow theologian's cognitive theories, thereby framing Nicholas's project in terms of theological debates concerning the intuitive cognition of non-existents and God's ability to cause false visions, Grellard begins with Nicholas's positive theory of knowledge. This effectively sidesteps the entire question of Nicholas's skepticism, a question Nicholas himself explicitly tried to avoid. Nicholas comes across as a philosopher keenly aware of the limits of human cognition, yet eager to develop a viable and wholly rational epistemology within those limits. Those limits, Grellard makes clear, have everything to do with appearances, with what we can rationally and legitimately infer about the world based upon what we see... (shrink)

When Donna Rice, who was brought into the public limelight as a companion to ex-presidentiaI candidate Gary Hart, appeared at a university ethics seminar, her statement, and the subsequent coverage, raised three troubling questions for journalists: the nature of academic inquiry, journalistic practices, and the right of people to define themselves.

D2.1 (PL models and assignments) i. A PL model is a pair M = 〈DM, ·M〉 such that (a) DM is a non-empty set, and (b) ·M maps each A ∈ Con to AM ∈ DM, and each B ∈ Prdn to BM  (DM)n. ii. GM = {g| g: Var  DM} is the set of M-assignments. For any g ∈ GM, u ∈ Var, d ∈ DM, g[u/d] := (g\{u, g(u)})  {u, d} is the u-to-d alternative to (...) g. (shrink)

We stipulate, arguendo, that fractional-reserve-demand deposit banking is per se fraudulent. We ask whether or not time deposit banking can also be illicit, and answer in the positive, if there is a mismatch between the time dimensions of deposits and loans. To wit, if an intermediary borrows short and lends long.

In Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4):711–716, 2009a), the present authors claim that borrowing short and lending long is fraudulent, and thus ought to be prohibited on legal grounds. Bagus and Howden (J Bus Ethics 90(3):399, 2009) take issue with our ethical analysis. The present paper is our response to these authors; it is an attempt to defend Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4):711–716, 2009a) against the very interesting and important, although we believe, erroneous, criticisms of Bagus and (...) Howden (J Bus Ethics 90(3):399, 2009). (shrink)

Wilderness valued as mere resource for human?interest satisfaction is challenged in favor of wilderness as a productive source, in which humans have roots, but which also yields wild neighbors and aliens with intrinsic value. Wild value is storied achievement in an evolutionary ecosystem, with instrumental and intrinsic, organismic and systemic values intermeshed. Survival value is reconsidered in this light. Changing cultural appreciations of values in wilderness can transform and relativize our judgments about appropriate conduct there. A final valued element in (...) wildness is its idiographic historical particularity, and most surprising is the emergence of a novel morality when humans learn to let values go wild. (shrink)

This study examines the use of a video news release in a specific story. Press coverage and editorial criticism in the case showed that journalists do not articulate sufficiently how the news owners' sway, through institutional controls, can lead to a hegemony of expedient action in the newsroom. Critical self-reflection by news workers will better enable journalists to ethically deliberate news choices that balance their responsibilities to owners, peers, and the public.

Many Christians treat marriage as a covenant. An influential group of contemporary Christians argues that covenant marriage provides a response to what they regard as the social ills of high divorce rates and the ‘breakdown’ of the traditional family. These Christians often look to John Calvin's marriage theology for inspiration because he linked treating marriage as a covenant to regarding marriage as sacred and indissoluble. In this article I cast doubt on the wisdom of treating marriage as a covenant. I (...) develop a critical genealogy that shows Calvin's marriage theology oppressed women by reinforcing their subordination to men and trapping women in abusive marriages. I then argue that recent social science suggests covenant marriage functions similarly among contemporary Christians. I consider whether a non-oppressive form of covenant marriage can be developed, before suggesting that we cannot yet know whether covenant marriage is salvageable. (shrink)

The theme "Dostoevsky and Nietzsche" is one of the most important for understanding the meaning of the abrupt changes that took place in European philosophy and culture at the turn of the nineteenth century. This epoch is still a puzzle: it was a flourishing period for the creative powers of European humanity and at the same time the beginning of the tragic "breakdown" of history that gave birth to two world wars and unprecedented calamities, the consequences of which Europe has (...) been unable to overcome, as shown by the uninterrupted decline of traditional culture, which began at the end of World War II and still continues today. In this epoch, as in the eighteenth century, which culminated in the Great French Revolution, philosophy came out of the study onto the street and became a practical force that steadily undermines the existing order of things; in a certain sense it was precisely philosophy that called forth the catastrophic events of the first half of the twentieth century, which had as never before a metaphysical subtext. At the center of the upheaval that engulfed absolutely all forms of European civilization and culminated, at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the rise of nonclassical science, "nonclassical" art, and "nonclassical" philosophy, was the problem of man, his essence, the meaning of his existence, and the problem of man's relations with society, the world, and the Absolute. It is no coincidence that M. Scheler used the term "anthropological turn" to describe the changes that occurred in philosophy in this epoch; what had long been implicit in philosophy and art and in paradoxical fashion had become apparent even in the new scientific theories, was now made clear: man is not a tiny "atom" in boundless and alien being, but the starting point for all suppositions, the primary field of meanings from which any philosophical or scientific "questioning" must depart. (shrink)

The key problems of Ivan Vyghovsky’s rule (the main problem among them – is Gadiatskiy pact in 1658) in Mykhailo Grushevskiy’s works are considered in the article. It’s emphasized the scientist’s ambiguity in treatment of polish Ukrainian compromise in 1658. On the one hand the researcher highly evaluates Ivan Vyghovskiy and his like minded persons for their realization the basic idea of social and political development of Ukrainian nation, the necessity of being independent and trying to legalize it in the (...) appropriate paragraphs of “Big kingdom of Russia”.On the other hand emphasizes the factors which caused the union “lack of vitality” and hopeless of I. Vyghovskiy’s polish foreign policy choice.In the scientist’s conception the compromise of 1658 is the result of acombination of a set of factors, opposing tendencies, which had a deep foundation; the current geopolitical realities. For the «Zaporizhzhya Army» it was seen as a salvation from the expansionist, incorporationist policy of Muscovy, the mechanism of affirmation of the Orthodox « Grand Duchy of Rus» as an equal component of the reorganized Commonwealth.Mykhailo Hrushevsky, while paying tribute to the Treaty of Hadiach asa political and legal act, which testified to the level of state thinking of the then Ukrainian elite, indicates, at the same time, his doom.First of all, the historian observes that the treatise was in a hurry, under pressure of circumstances, it may have a temporary character. The most dangerous thing in the treaty is the «... competition of the Cossack and Nobility element...». The researcher believes that the basis of the Hadiach Union was nobility, because it was called «... to restore the economic and political affluence... of this social stratum...».Even the acquisition of the nobility`s rights by the Cossack sergeant «... meant only the strengthening of the nobility stratum against the Cossack masses». Therefore, for the Cossack public (for the common people - moreover, because it was not mentioned in the treaty) the union was unacceptable. In addition, the weak power of the Commonwealth government was incapable of fulfilling allied obligations to the «Zaporizhzhya Army» and the magnate-nobility community has demonstrated its inability to engage in relations with it on a parity basis.In contrast to the Hadiach apologists in 1658, who admired the preferencesfor the Ukrainian in the field of education and culture. Mykhailo Hrushevskyconvincingly states: «For us, from a retrospective perspective, it is quite clear that the Hadiach Union did not look to be successful...».In fact, only a formal Ukrainian-Polish compromise on the 6th(16th ) September 1658, could have been the basis of a federal union of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania: the really progressive provisions of the treaty, which were proposed by Y. Nemirich - I. Vyhovsky, were already limited in time by signing it near Hadiach ; then - substantially eliminated in the process of ratification by the Warsaw Sejm; The illogical view of the coexistence of the Cossack emancipated Ukraine with the state-regulated Crown (with privileged nobility and followed by a feudal dependent slap) is seen in the «renewed» Commonwealth. That is why the Hadiach Treaty eventually became one of the decisive factors in defeat of Vyhovsky as a hetman.And at the same time it remains a Memorandum of such a desired mutual forgiveness and consent of the elites of the two peoples for a better life of each of them. (shrink)

As noted in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, presented by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the economy is taking on an entirely new scale of operations at the present stage. The basis of our economic power is coming to be industry with its numerous branches and a socialist agriculture organized on a large scale, advanced science, and skilled corps of workers, experts in (...) technology, and managers. Incomparably higher levels of the economy, of socialist social relationships, of culture, and of the consciousness of the broad masses of the workers are being attained. All this enables us today to set and attain objectives we could not have dreamed of at earlier stages in the building of socialism. (shrink)

A necessary prerequisite for application, to the humanities, of the techniques of contemporary logic, which have proven so effective in the formalization of the natural sciences, is explication of concepts, i.e., the setting up of unambiguous analogs permitting subsequent formal operations with these concepts within the confines of a clearly defined model. Today, the need for and the fruitfulness of modeling are obvious, and any explication meeting the requirements of unambiguity is therefore regarded as unquestionably a step forward. This is (...) entirely natural. (shrink)

On the scale of decades and centuries, ongoingscience is reconfigured into human history that must be interpreted. So I concluded two decades back: "Progressively reforming and developing theories are erected over observations.... This leads at a larger scale to progressively reforming and developing narrative models.... The story is ever reforming" (pp. 338 — 39). I faced the future with hopes and fears about the escalating powers of science for good and evil, finding it simultaneously powerless for the meaningful guidance of (...) life, the classical province of religion. So now„having turned the millennium, what's new in the story? If I had to give a sound-bite answer (as we now must do with the media), my reply would be: increasing concern about human uniqueness and human respon-. (shrink)

UPDATE WITH NOMINAL CENTERING (UCδ) D1.0 (UCδ types) The set of UCδ types Θ is the smallest set such that: i. t, δ, s ∈ Θ ii. (ab) ∈ Θ, if a, b ∈ Θ D1.1 (UCδ basic terms). For each a ∈ Θ, a set of a-constants Cona and a-variables Vara, incl.: Conδ = {a, b, c} Var(sδ) = {x, y, z}.